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Alexander: Justice for Rwanda

COMMENT
JUSTICE FOR RWANDA
TOWARD A UNIVERSAL LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION

In 1994, an armed conflict raged in Rwanda between a

non-state party and the Rwandan Government. l This armed
conflict triggered the attempted extermination of the Tutsi
ethnic group by the Rwandan Government. As a result of this
appalling campaign, the United Nations (hereinafter "U.N.")
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter "ICTR") to prosecute three categories of offenses against
the law of nations, classified as human-rights violations, committed during the Rwandan conflict: genocide, 2 crimes against
humanity,3 and violations of humanitarian law. 4 Because of the
1 s.c. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at P2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994) !hereinafter S.C. Res. 955].
2 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, 33 I.L.M
ICTR
Statute],
available
at
1602
!hereinafter
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHlbasicdocs/statute.html.

Genocide means "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing
members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group." Id.
3 ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 3.
Crimes against humanity are any of the "following crimes when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; <0 Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts." Id.
4 Statute of the ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 4.
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serious nature of genocide and crimes against humanity, international law applies universally to these crimes regardless of
where and how they occur.5 For political reasons, however, different standards of humanitarian law apply to crimes committed during international and non-international armed conflicts. 6 Crimes committed during international conflicts are
"war crimes" and are "grave breaches" of humanitarian law. 7
Crimes committed during international conflicts are subject to
the full extent of humanitarian law, whereas crimes committed
during non-international conflicts are not "war crimes" and are
governed by only limited portions of humanitarian law. 8 This
is not because crimes committed during non-international conflicts are less serious than war crimes, but because nationstates are apprehensive of applying strict international standards to internal wars for fear that it will legitimize rebel
groups and thereby undermine the exclusive national authority
of the state over its territory.9
Violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda constitute "committing or ordering
to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of
8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to: (a) Violence to
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b)
Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (0 Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples; (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts." Id.
S See generally Statute of the ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 2, 3, Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal, art. 4, 5, 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1195, available at
http://www.un.org/ictyllegaldocJindex.htm [hereinafter Statute of the ICT¥].
6 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, VOLUME 1 207 (Transnational Publishers 1998).
7 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug. 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, [hereinafter
Geneva
Convention
I),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287 a42141256739003e636b/fe20c3d903ce27 e3c 12
5641e004a92£3?OpenDocument.
81d.
9 Id.
"The fear that the Protocol might affect State sovereignty, prevent governments from effectively maintaining law and order within their borders and that it
might be invoked to justify outside intervention led to the decision of the Diplomatic
Conference at its fourth session to shorten and simplify the Protocol...[tlhe restrictive
definition of the material field of application in Article 1 will have the effect that Protocol II will be applicable to a smaller range of internal conflicts than Article 3 common
to the Conventions of 1949." International Committee for the Red Cross, Introduction
to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
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The Rwandan conflict was categorized as a noninternational conflict by the U.N. Security Council; therefore,
only limited portions of humanitarian law apply.lo Humanitarian law for prosecuting crimes committed during noninternational conflicts is less extensive than humanitarian law
prosecuting crimes committed during international conflicts.ll
Accordingly, the judges at both the ICTR and its sister tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "ICTY") have worked to strengthen the laws
governing internal armed conflicts.12 As a result, the discrepancy of treatment between a non-international and an international armed conflict is being steadily eroded. 13 The two tribunals are re-interpreting existing humanitarian law, lessening
the distinction between internal and international armed conflictsY Despite new interpretations of the law, however, codified customary law continues to apply different standards to
crimes committed during non-international conflicts and those
committed during international conflicts. 15 This Comment
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8 June 1977)
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflfl3d1abd6ei26cca41256739003e636c1aaOc5bcbab5c4a85c125
63cd002d6d09?OpenDocument (2004).
10 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935, United Nations Commission of Experts'll 108
[hereinafter "Commission of Experts Report] at S/199411405 (1994). The Commission
of Experts is a U.N. body responsible for compiling the official report on the situation in
Rwanda.Id.
11 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
supra note 6, at 141.
12Id.
13 Id; See also, LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT, 51 (Cambridge University Press 2002).
14 See Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber II (1997) 'II 6.12 (where
the appellate court held that Common Article Three applies to all armed conflicts regardless of whether non-international or international in nature). Id. 'II 6.13 (where
the court held that individual criminal responsibility applies in cases of noninternational conflicts despite the lack of specific language in Common Article Three).
Available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-e.htm. See also Case ICTR-96-42, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber I 'II 615 (where the trial chamber held the
above jurisprudence of the ICTY to be persuasive on the issue of individual criminal
responsibility).
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, Para 2, sec. (c) - (0, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.183/9 (1998). The Statute
of the International Criminal Court divides armed conflicts according to whether they
occurred during international or non-international conflicts_ Id. But see LINDSAY
MOrn, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT, 166, in which he argues the Statute of
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explores the means whereby the laws of armed conflict may be
redrafted to incorporate the trend toward the universal treatment of armed conflicts established by the ICTR and the ICTY.
Section I of this Comment provides a history of the Rwandan armed conflict and a description of the laws of armed conflict. It focuses on the basic laws of armed conflict, the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols, and describes how these
laws have been interpreted by the ICTY and ICTR. 16 Section II
addresses the classification of the Rwandan armed conflict as a
non-international conflict. This section discusses Ugandan
support for the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front ("hereinafter
RPF") and the murder of ten Belgian U.N. peacekeepers by
Rwandan troops. The Section proposes changing the definition
of an international conflict, thereby strengthening the coverage
of humanitarian law. 17
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE RWANDAN ARMED CONFLICT

Rwanda was a colony of Belgium until 1959. 18 During Belgian colonial rule, the Roman Catholic Church and the Belgian
Government institutionalized ethnic identities in Rwanda, issuing every citizen identity cards based on their ethnic groUp.19
The rationale for establishing ethnicity in Rwanda came from
assumptions based on a nineteenth-century theory that Tutsis
were members of a racially superior group called Hamites. 20
The Belgians viewed the Tutsi minority as being ethnically superior to the Hutu majority and a small Tutsi elite was supported by the Belgian Government and placed in a position of
the International Criminal Court represents a step toward unification of the laws of
armed conflicts because of its detailed provisions on internal armed conflicts. [d.
16 See generally n. 18-96.
17 See generally n. 97-146.
18 ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT
PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE
SURROUNDING
EVENTS
[hereinafter
OAU
Report],
3.1
(2000),
at
http://www.aegistrust.org/sections/reports/contents.asp?fllter=oau.
19 [d. § 2.10.
20 PHILIP GoUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 5HPicador 1998). See generally, MAHMOOD MAMDANI,
WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, Chapter Two (Princeton University Press 2001) (discussing the application to Rwanda of the theory of Hamitic descent).
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leadership.21 Although there is little documented evidence of
any racial difference between people that call themselves
"Hutu" or "Tutsi," the division became entrenched in Rwandan
society.22
After Rwanda gained independence from Belgium, the
western world and many Hutu politicians saw democracy in
Rwanda as requiring majority, or Hutu, rule. 23 The Hutu, however, were divided along regional and class lines. 24 Attempting
to unify Hutu people by creating a common enemy, Rwandan
politicians demonized the Tutsi by characterizing them as
Hutu oppressors. 25 The Western world supported a Hutucontrolled government, despite the fact that violence against
the Tutsi increased. 26 Between 1959 and 1967, 20,000 Tutsi
were killed in Rwanda because of their ethnicity, and 300,000
Tutsi fled the country.27
During the presidency of Juvenal Habyarimana,28 who
came to office in 1973, there was a decrease in anti-Tutsi
propaganda,29 but the Tutsi in Rwanda continued to be
harassed and treated like second-class citizens. 3o As a result,
Tutsi continued to flee the country during this period, and the
number of exiled Tutsi in Uganda reached 200,000 by 1970.31
President Habyarimana claimed that Rwanda was too poor to
allow the exiles to return. 32

21 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 2.11.
[d. § 2.3.
[d. § 2.12.
24 [d. § 3.9.
25 [d. § 3.9, See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY
(Human
Rights
Watch
1999),
Introduction,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org!reportsl1999/rwandalGenol-3-01.htm#P6_41.
26 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 3.14.
27 [d; See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, The
Strategy of Ethnic Division, supra note 25.
28 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY The Strategy of
Ethnic Division, supra note 25. President Habyarimana, a Hutu, was a member of
Rwanda's sole political power, the MRND, which was dominated by politicians of the
Hutu ethnicity. [d.
29 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 4.2
30 [d. § 4.1.
31 [d. § 6.4, see also MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra
note 20, at 164.
32 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 6.8.
22

23
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On October 1, 1990, an army of exiled Rwandan Tutsi invaded Rwanda. 33 Although Tutsi refugees from Rwanda had
settled in neighboring Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania,
the invading army originated almost exclusively in Uganda. 34
Ill-treated by the Ugandan Government, the displaced Rwandans joined the rebel National Resistance Army (hereinafter
"NRA"), where they received training in guerilla warfare. The
NRA, under the control of Yoweri Museveni, took control of
Uganda in 1986. At that time, Rwandan Tutsi made up almost
one quarter of the NRA, and many top NRA officers were also
Rwandan Tutsi. 35 After coming to power, President Museveni's
government came under criticism for being "partial" to Rwandan Tutsi. 36 In order to counteract these claims, the new government marginalized Rwandan Tutsi within Uganda. On October 1, 1990, frustrated Tutsi soldiers from the NRA renamed
themselves the Rwandan Patriotic Front (hereinafter "RPF")
and invaded Rwanda from Uganda. 37
Despite the fact that there was little evidence of Rwandan
Tutsi collaborating with the invading army, the Rwandan
Hutu-controlled government chose to portray the invasion as a
united effort on the part of all Tutsi to seize control of
Rwanda. 3s Top Rwandan government officials conspired to
decimate the Tutsi population within Rwanda. 39 In April 1994,
President Habyarimana's plane was shot down en route to the
capital. 40 The Rwandan government used the assassination as
an excuse to begin massacres of Tutsi civilians in Rwanda. 41
The day after the president's assassination, plans for the genocide went into operation and the massacres began. 42 Jean
Kambanda, Prime Minister of Rwanda at the time, stated,

33 [d. § 6.2, See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY,
The Strategy of Ethnic Division, supra note 25.
34 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 6.l.
35 [d. § 173.
36 [d. § 180.
37 [d. § 6.9.
38 [d. § 6.22, see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY,
PREPARATIONS FOR SLAUGHTER, supra note 25.
39 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 14.4.
40 [d. § 14.1, see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY,
The Attack, supra note 25.
41 [d; See also OAU Report, supra note 18, § 14.l.
42 [d. § 14.2.
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"[T]here was in Rwanda in 1994 a widespread and systematic
attack against the civilian population of Tutsi .... "43
In recognition of the serious events unfolding in Rwanda,
the U.N. created a peace-keeping mission for Rwanda in 1993
called the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (hereinafter
"UNAMIR").44 UNAMIR solders began arriving in Rwanda in
February, 1993; one third of the 1,260 UNAMIR solders were
from Belgium. 45 On the day after President Habyarimana's
plane crashed, Rwandan solders killed ten Belgian UNAMIR
"Blue Helmets. "46 The Blue Helmets had been sent to guard
the Prime Minister of Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate leader who was targeted for assassination by Hutu extremists within the Rwandan government. 47 The ten Belgian
soldiers were originally assisted in their mission by five Ghanaian UNAMIR troops, who were separated from the Belgians
after a rumor spread among the Rwandan troops that the Belgian soldiers were responsible for shooting down the president's plane. 48 Thus, only the Belgian soldiers were killed. 49
After the murders, Belgium withdrew its troops from the
UNAMIR mission. 50
In addition to acts of genocide and crimes against humanity, those responsible for the genocide are also charged with
numerous war crimes, such as the murder of civilians not taking active part in the hostilities and the murder of opposition
party members for political reasons. 51 One hundred days after
the genocide began, between 500,000 and one million people,

[d. § 14.4.
GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, 194 (Hurst and Company 1995).
45 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 15.9.
46 [d. § 15.8.
47 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, supra note 45, at 230.
48 COMMISSION D'ENQUETE PARLEMENTAlRE CONCERNANT LES EVENEMENTS DU
RWANDA, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION D'ENQUETE, 405 [hereinafter Rapport Fait au Nom de la Commission d'Enquetel (Senat de Belgique 1997).
49 RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION D'ENQUETE, supra note 48, at 405.
50 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 15.9.
51 See Case ICTR-97-20, Prosecutor v. Semenza, Judgment and Sentence § 535,
551 (15 May 2003), for an example of the ICTR finding an accused guilty of murder and
rape as violations of humanitarian law. [d. Semenza was not charged, however, because of the concurrence of the charges with charges of crimes against humanity. [d. §
536, 552. For a general description of crimes committed in Rwanda, see generally
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, The Structure, supra note
25.
43

44
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mostly Tutsi and Hutu opposition party members, were dead. 52
In July 1994, the RPF won the war, took power from the Hutucontrolled government, and put an end to both the armed conflict and the genocide. 53
B.

THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICT: THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

Mer the horrors committed during World War II, nationstates recognized the need for laws regulating armed conflict to
prohibit future atrocities. 54 The Geneva Conventions were
adopted in 1949 and bind their High Contracting Parties55 to
customary rules of humanitarian law. 56 There are four Geneva
Conventions, each of which deals with a separate category of
protected persons: wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, shipwrecked sailors and civilians. 57 The Geneva Conventions are
made up of numerous articles, the majority of which deal exclusively with international armed conflicts.58 Only Article
Three of the Geneva Conventions (hereinafter "Common Article
52 OAU Report, supra note 18, § 14.2. The exact figure is in dispute. Id. See also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, Numbers, supra note 25.
53 Avocats
Sans
Frontieres,
ASF
au
Rwanda,
available
at
http://www.asf.beIFR/Frameset.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). See also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, The End of Hutu Power, supra note
25.
M See generally, International Committee for the Red Cross, Advisory Service on
International Law, What is International Humanitarian Law? (June 2002) at
http://www.icrc.org/webleng/siteengO.nsf7htmlaIV57JNXM/$FILElWhat_is_IHL.pdf?Op
enElement.
55 A High Contracting Party is a country, or sovereign state, that has signed the
Geneva
Conventions.
For
a
list
of
signatory
parties,
see
http://www.icrc.org/WeblEng/siteengO.nsf7htmV5 7JMKH?OpenDocument.
56 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
11],
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfl7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/44072487ec4c2131c12
5641e004a9977?OpenDocument. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, [hereinafter
Geneva
Convention
111],
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfl7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef'854a3517b75ac12
5641e004age68?OpenDocument. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75, U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter
Geneva
Convention
IV] ,
available
at
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsfl7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/67 56482d86146898c1
25641e004aa3c5?OpenDocument.
571d.
58 Id.
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Three"), present in all four conventions, applies to noninternational armed conflicts.59
The drafters of Common Article Three intentionally limited its scope in relation to the other articles of the Geneva
Conventions. 60 Common Article Three, therefore, represents a
"minimum humanitarian standard," guaranteeing only the
most basic of rights to victims of non-international armed conflictsY Those portions of the Geneva Conventions that apply
only to international armed conflicts are more extensive and
detailed than Common Article Three. 62 The Geneva Conventions marginalize non-international armed conflicts, but many
serious, non-international armed conflicts have taken place
since the Geneva Conventions were drafted. 63 In recognition
that Common Article Three is inadequate in light of the large
number of serious non-international armed conflicts, the majority of U.N. member states adopted Additional Protocol 11.64
59 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7, Art. 3. See also Geneva Convention II,
supra note 56, Art. 3, Geneva Convention III, supra note 56, Art. 3, Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 56, Art. 3.
60 See International Committee for the Red Cross, Commentary to Article Three,
Conflicts not of an International Character, 38, Geneva Convention I, (12 August
1949),
available
at
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsfib466ed681ddfcfd241256739003e636811919123eOd 12lfefc 125
63cd004lfc08?OpenDocument, for examples of the concerns over state sovereignty
raised during the drafting. Id. The Commentary notes the, "special obstacles arising
out of the internal politics of the States in which the conflict raged. In a civil war the
lawful Government, or that which so styles itself, tends to regard its adversaries as
common criminals." Id.
61 COMITE II\'TER.."l"ATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE, COMl.\1EI\'TAIRE A LA CO!\TVE!\TTION
DE GENEVE RELATIVE AU TRAITEMENT DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE, 46 (Jean Pictet,
ed. 1958). See also LINDSAY Morn, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT at 46. See
also Prosecutor v. Tadic 'lI 6.12 (where the court interpreted Common Article Three to
be a minimum standard applying to all armed conflicts: "each of the prohibitions in
Common Article 3 ...constitute, as the Court put it, 'elementary considerations of humanity.''' See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
14 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icaseslinUS/inusframe.htm.
62 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7, art. 16, 18. The Geneva Conventions contain many specific provisions that are not enumerated in Common Article Three. Id.
Many of these provisions expressly criminalize conduct that occurred in Rwanda. Id.
For example, Art. 16 affords special protection to expectant mothers, who were often
the target of inhumane treatment during the genocide. Id. Art. 18 specifically exempts
civilian hospitals from attack, but hospitals were targeted during the genocide as convenient places to round up and kill Tutsi. Id; See also, MORRIS & SCHARF, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 6, at 141.
63 LINDSAY Morn, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT at 1. The Red Cross
estimates that eighty percent of victims of violence are victims of "non-international
armed conflicts." Available at www.icrc.org.
64 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), [herein-
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Additional Protocol II was adopted to expand and clarify
Common Article Three. 65 It adds several new provisions to protect civilians during non-international conflicts. 66 Additional
Protocol II, however, fails to address several important problems inherent in Common Article Three. 67 The same political
concerns that plagued the drafting of Common Article Three
were raised by concerned member states during the drafting of
Additional Protocol 11.68 Specifically, the Protocol fails to expressly provide for individual criminal responsibility for persons in a position of authority during an armed conflict, nor
does it criminalize omissions--the failures of persons in authority to prevent crimes being committed under their command. 69
Finally, Additional Protocol II does not explain the difference
between a non-international and an international armed conflict, making it difficult to determine when the Protocol should

after
Additional
Protocol
II]
8
June
1977,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/d67c3971bcftlc10c125
641e0052b545?OpenDocument. The member countries also adopted Additional Protocol I to update the laws applicable to international armed conflicts. Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol!), !hereinafter Additional Protocol 8 June
1977,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/ffic8b9fee14a77fdc125
641e0052b079?OpenDocument. Rwanda acceded to both protocols. See International
Committee
of the
Red
Cross,
States
Parties
&
Signatories,
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView.
65 Additional Protocol II, supra note 64, art. 1. For example, Additional Protocol
II clarifies the meaning of "armed conflict". Id. "Situations of internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature," are not armed conflicts and are not subject to international law. ld;
See also LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAw OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT at 88.
66 Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 43, 44.
67 COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE, COMMENTAIRE DES PROTOCOLES
ADDITIONNELS, 1358 (Martinus Nijhoff 1986) !hereinafter Commentaire des Protocols
Additionnelsl.
68 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June
1977, General introduction to the Commentary on Protocol II, 4394, available at
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsflb466ed681ddfcfd241256739003e636810f47ae2ffia509689c125
63cd004399df?OpenDocument. "These debates, which were very intense, revealed a
tendency to move towards a rather restrictive definition of non-international armed
conflict which was in danger of no longer being fully in line with common Article 3."
ld.
69 Commentaire des Protocoles Additionnels at 1358.
In contrast, Additional
Protocol I (applying exclusively to international conflicts) criminalizes omissions and
provides for individual criminal responsibility. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64,
art. 86.

n
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be applied. 70 Despite the improvements of Additional Protocol
II, important differences still exist between the law of international armed conflict and the law of non-international armed
conflict.

C.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

Recent jurisprudence from both the ICTY and the ICTR
strengthens the laws applicable to non-international conflicts.71
For example, the ICTY, relying on the reasoning of the Nuremburg Tribunal,72 has imposed individual criminal responsibility
for violations of humanitarian law committed during noninternational armed conflicts.73 The ICTR, calling the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the Nuremburg Tribunal "persuasive,"
has imposed individual criminal responsibility for violations of
humanitarian law committed during a non-international conflict.74 These and other decisions by the ICTY and ICTR are
slowly eroding the distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts.
1.

The Jurisprudence of the ICTY

In addition to extending the principle of individual criminal responsibility to violations of humanitarian law committed
during non-international conflicts, the ICTY has generated a
considerable amount of jurisprudence on the difference between an international and a non-international conflict.75 The
70 Additional Protocol II, supra note 64. See also The International Committee of
the Red Cross, General Introduction to the Commentary on Protocol II, (14 Feb. 2002),
available
at
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsf!b466ed681ddfcfd241256739003e6368/0f4 7 ae2ffia509689c 125
63cd004399df?OpenDocument. Additional Protocol I, however, drafted to expand the
application of the Geneva Conventions to international conflicts, defines an international conflict as occurring "between two High Contracting Parties," or sovereign
states. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64.
71 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
supra note 6, at 141. [d. at 128.
72 The Nuremburg Tribunal was created to prosecute crimes committed by German
officials
during
World
War
II.
See
generally
http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlimtlimt.htm.
73 Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 1995) § 128.
74 Case ICTR-96-4-T, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence (2 Sept.
1998) § 612-615.
75 Statute for the ICTY, supra note 5.
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U.N. Security Council found the Yugoslav conflict contained
both non-international and international elements. 76 The ICTY
statute splits humanitarian law into two parts: Article Two of
the ICTY Statute includes all of the Geneva Conventions relating to international conflicts, while Article Three of the statute
gives the ICTY jurisdiction over Common Article Three and
Protocol 11.77 It became necessary, therefore, for the ICTY to
determine which portions of the Yugoslav conflict were noninternational and which were international, in order to apply
the correct statutory article.
The ICTY grappled with this problem in several cases. 78
Prosecutor v. Tadic was the first case in which a Trial Chamber
considered the issue of whether an armed conflict was international or non-internationa}.79 The Geneva Conventions state
that an international conflict occurs between two High Contracting Parties, or sovereign states, but the Tadic Court held
that an international conflict may also exist when a foreign
state exercises control over a non-state party to the conflict.80
In reaching its conclusions, the Tadic Court looked to the
decisions of other international courts that had interpreted the
Geneva Conventions in the past.81 In particular, the Court considered Nicaragua v. United States of America, in which the
International Court of Justice dealt with a similar issue. s2
76 See http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireportJar99/eur70.htm for a history of the
Yugoslav conflict. A single country, Yugoslavia, fractured into several states during
the course of the conflict. [d.
77 Statute of the ICTY, supra note 5.
78 See Prosecutor v Tadic, supra note 14. See also Prosecutor v. Mucic et al.,
Case No. IT-96-21, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14fl available at
http://www.un.org/icty. In Tadic, the accused was charged with murder, beatings and
inhumane acts. The accused pled not guilty. See generally Press Release CCIPIO/190E, The Verdict (7 May 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/casesljugemindexe.htm.
79 Prosecutor v. Tadic at 112.
80 [d. at 116.
81 [d. at 99.
82 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 61, where
Nicaragua accused the United States of funding and supporting a rebel military group
within Nicaragua. [d.

The Court has taken the view that United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of
the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning
of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself...for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. [d. '11115.
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Nicaragua required that for a conflict to be deemed international, the foreign state must exercise "complete" control over
the non-state party.83 "Complete" control meant the foreign
state had to order the non-state party to commit specific acts. 54
The Tadic Court, however, held this level of control to be unnecessarily high.85 According to the Tadic decision, the foreign
state need not give "specific instructions" to the non-state
party.86 The foreign state, however, must still exercise "overall
control" over the non-state party, helping to plan its military
campaign and sharing its military objectives. 87
Judge McDonald's dissent in Tadic argued that an even
lower standard of control should apply to prevent legal technicalities from changing the nature of a conflict. 88 The Court in
Prosecutor v. Mucic et al. applied Judge McDonald's reasoning,
holding the conflict in that case to be international because the
non-state party, though given a new name, remained under
foreign-state contro1.89 The "overall control" test continues to
be the standard used by the ICTY for determining whether Article Two or Article Three of the ICTY Statute should be applied in a particular case. 90
Id.'
Id.
85 Prosecutor v. Tadic at 157.
86Id. at 137.
83
84

Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their
targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations
and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group. Id.

87 Prosecutor v. Tadic at 157.
[Ilt is not sufficient for the group to be financially or even militarily assisted by a
State ... In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a
State, it must be proved that the State wields overall control over the group, not
only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in
the general planning of its military activity. Id.
88 Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, 15 (7 May 1997).
89 Case IT-96-21, Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., Judgment (16 November 1998) 'II 233.
See also JOHN R. W. D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRmUNALS, 68 (Transnational Publishers 2003).
90

JOHN

R. W. D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

TRIBUNALS at 55.
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The Statute of the ICTR

Article Four of the ICTR statute contains Common Article
Three and Additional Protocol 11.91 Unlike the ICTY statute,
the ICTR statute does not include the rest of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol 1. 92 The U.N. Security Council
decided that the conflict in Rwanda was "internal" in nature. 93
The Security Council based its decision on the findings of the
U.N. Commission of Experts. 94 The Commission of Experts conducted a survey of evidence gathered by human-rights organizations in Rwanda and found the armed conflict taking place in
Rwanda between April 6 and July 15, 1994, to be a noninternational armed conflict because foreign-state involvement
was limited to "peacemaking and humanitarian functions
rather than belligerent action. 1195 The courts of the ICTR,
unlike courts in the ICTY, have never addressed the issue of
international versus non-international armed conflicts in their
deliberations. 96
II.

ANALYSIS

It is a fundamental principle of law that similar crimes
should be punished similarly, yet two sets of rules exist for violations of humanitarian law. Violations of humanitarian law
occurring during an international conflict are war crimes, punishable by an extensive and detailed set of laws. The same
acts, when committed during a non-international conflict, are
Statute of the ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 4.
Statute ofthe ICTR, supra note 2, at art. 2.
93 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 955 (1994) U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 [Hereinafter "Report of the SecretaryGeneral"). See also Helen Durham, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tri·
bunals, in THE CHANGING FACE OF CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw, 199 (Helen Durham & John McCormack, eds., 1999). "Whilst the
ICTY also has jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war
crimes, the fact that the Rwandan conflict is not characterized as an international
conflict has resulted in the exclusion of these two crimes from its Statute." Id.
94 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 10, 'II 108. See also
Report of the Secretary-General at 3.
95 Final Report of the Commission of Experts 'II 108. The speedy creation of the
ICTR, "limited opportunities for lengthy debate on much of the legal technicalities."
Helen Durham, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, supra note 91,
at 198.
96 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 14, 'II 601.
91
92
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not war crimes and are subject to a lesser body of law. The circumstances surrounding a violation of humanitarian law,
rather than the nature of the violation, determine the type of
law to be applied. While basic humanitarian standards are
upheld in Common Article Three and Additional Protocol II, a
comparison of these instruments with the other Geneva Convention articles and Additional Protocol I cannot help but expose the marginalization of non-international conflicts.
Two points emerge from this analysis. First, as armed conflicts are often very complex, and the law applied to a conflict is
determined by its nature, every aspect of a particular conflict
must be thoroughly examined before the conflict can be categoIf a nonrized as international or non-international.
international armed conflict could be reclassified as an international armed conflict, it should be so reclassified to obtain the
full protection of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. The "overall control" test was developed by the ICTY to
differentiate between international and internal armed conflicts occurring in the former Yugoslavia, but it could prove a
useful tool in determining the nature of other complex armed
conflicts. Is the Rwandan armed conflict, for example, actually
international in nature? . Is it, instead, a conflict made up of
both international and non-international parts?
Second, the international community must work toward
abolishing the distinction between the laws regulating international and non-international armed conflicts. Humanitarian
law should apply with equal force to international and noninternational armed conflicts. The applicability of humanitarian law to a particular act should not depend upon abstruse
and technical distinctions between types of conflicts. Unfortunately, even if portions of the Rwandan armed conflict can be
reclassified as international, much of the Rwandan armed conflict, the Yugoslav conflict, and, indeed, armed conflicts worldwide remain internal affairs, outside the scope of most humanitarian law.
A.

APPLYING THE "OVERALL CONTROL" TEST TO RWANDA

Nothing like the "overall control" test created by the ICTY
has been developed by the ICTR because the U.N. Security
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Council and the U.N. Commission of Experts categorized the
Rwandan conflict as non-internationa1. 97 Two aspects of the
Rwandan armed conflict, however, are potentially international
in nature. The first is Ugandan financing and support for the
RPF invasion. The second is the murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers by Rwandan troops.

1.

Invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front

The RPF invasion is usually seen as the armed return of
Tutsi refugees to Rwanda, but scholars have also pointed out
that regional developments played a key role in sparking the
Rwandan armed conflict. 98 The RPF, while not openly supported by President Museveni of Uganda, had his tacit support
and received material aid from the Ugandan government. 99 To
what extent the Ugandan Government supported, or even controlled, the RPF is debatable. President Museveni knew of the
impending RPF attack on Rwanda, though not the exact date
or circumstances under which it was to take place. 101 President
Museveni allowed the RPF to use weapons they had been given

97
98
99

Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 10, 'II 108.
MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 20, at 159.
MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 20, at 183.

Years later, President Museveni told his fellow regional heads of state meeting in
Harare that, while the [Rwandan Tutsi] in the NRA had informed him in advance
'of their intention to organize to regain their rights in Rwanda,' they had launched
the invasion 'without prior consultation.' Significantly, he continued, even though
'faced with [a] fait accompli situation by our Rwandan brothers,' Uganda decided
'to help the [RPF], materially, so that they are not defeated because that would
have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been
good for Uganda's stability.' It was as candid an admission of complicity as any
head of state could have made. [d.
100 [d. "Years later, President Museveni told his fellow regional heads of state
meeting in Harare that, while the [Rwandan Tutsi] in the NRA had informed him in
advance 'of their intention to organize to regain their rights in Rwanda,' they had
launched the invasion 'without prior consultation.' Significantly, he continued, even
though 'faced with [a] fait accompli situation by our Rwandan brothers,' Uganda decided 'to help the [RPF], materially, so that they are not defeated because that would
have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been good for
Uganda's stability.' It was as candid an admission of complicity as any head of state
could have made." MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note
18, at 183.
101 [d.
102 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 42, at 97 (Hurst and
Company 1995).
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when serving as Ugandan solders. 103 The RPF invaded
Rwanda with equipment from Uganda, including machineguns, rocket-launchers, rifles, and other equipment. l05 The
Ugandan government, however, put up roadblocks to prevent
more NRA solders from deserting to join the RPF.106 Later in
the war, Museveni allowed the RPF to reenter Uganda to regroup and the RPF continued to receive arms from Uganda
throughout the war. 107 The level of Ugandan involvement in
the RPF invasion is still a matter of debate and the armed conflict can be seen either as a foreign invasion or a civil war. lOB
The Rwandan government raised the issue of Ugandan
support of the RPF before the Security CounciLl09 In Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, the court cited to the U.N. Security Council's characterization of the Rwandan conflict, which stated that it was
non-internationaL 110 In a later case, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,
the court stated only that due to the evidence presented by several expert witnesses, the conflict in Rwanda was a noninternational conflict between the then-existing government of
Rwanda and "dissident forces."lll Was the involvement of the
Ugandan government enough to qualify the RPF invasion as an
international conflict?
The "overall control" test, outlined in Tadic, is as follows:
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary
group to a State, it must be proved that the State wields
overall control over the group, not only by equipping and fi-

GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 97.
OAP Report, supra note 16, Chapter 6
105 Id at 93.
106 Id. at 94.
107 Id at 115.
108 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS, supra note 20, at 160.
The answer is complex, but it seems that the two extreme positions, namely the official
Ugandan line ('our good faith was surprised by cunning conspirators') and the Kigali
propaganda line ('this is a planned invasion supported by the Ugandan government.. .')
are both untenable. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 97.
109 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
supra note 6, at 142 n.602.
110 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 14, 'II 604. Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), U.N. Doc.
811995/134 at 3.
m Case ICTR-96-3, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 435, Trial Chamber I (1999), available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm.
103

104
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nancing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the
general planning of its military activity.ll2

There is evidence that the RPF was financed and equipped
by the Ugandan government, but did the Ugandan government
coordinate or plan the military activity of the RPF? To a certain extent, the Ugandan government wanted the Rwandan
refugees to return to Rwanda. 113 Yet, a general desire that the
Tutsi return to Rwanda and turning a blind eye to the organization and training of troops from its army are not the same as
the Ugandan government actively participating in planning an
invasion of Rwanda. Under the "overall control" test as defined
in Tadic, it is unlikely Ugandan involvement in the RPF invasion would rise to the level of "overall control" needed to render
the armed conflict international in nature.
Was the RPF, like the Serbian troops in Mucic et al.,
merely part of the Ugandan army under a different name?114
The RPF troops were Ugandan troops under a new name, but
the change of name cannot be called a ruse by the Ugandan
government to avoid complicity in the invasion. The formation
of the RPF was accomplished by a rogue group within the
Ugandan army. The Ugandan leadership did not actively participate in forming the RPF. What is lacking in the relationship between Uganda and the RPF is the element of willful or
intentional involvement in the RPF invasion by the Ugandan
government.
Even if the conflict in Rwanda cannot be classified as a
conflict between two sovereign states, the U.N. itself found that
the conflict caused instability in the region. ll5 If a conflict occurring within one country affects neighboring countries, is the
conflict international? The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor u.
Kanyabashi concluded that a non-international conflict may
have international repercussions, but that these repercussions

Supra note 87.
Supra note 99.
114 Prosecutor v Mucic et ai, supra note 78, 'lI 233. The Trial Chamber held that
changing the name of the Government controlled group was an intentional attempt to,
"mask the continued involvement of the [Government troops] in the conflict while its
Government remained in fact the controlling force .... " [d. 'lI 234.
115 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
supra note 6, at 112, n.506.
112

113
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do not make the conflict international. ll6 It is the causes of a
conflict, and not its effects, that determine its nature. It can be
seen from this analysis that in order for a conflict to be international, two Sovereign States must intentionally involve themselves in that conflict.

2.

The Murder ofTen Belgian Solders from the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda

Why does the involvement of U.N. troops in Rwanda, who
are clearly under the control of a sovereign, foreign body, not
render portions of the Rwandan conflict international? Ten
Belgian UNAMIR solders were killed protecting the Prime
Minister of Rwanda. U7 Unlike the RPF, the U.N. peacekeepers
were clearly under the command and control of a foreign body,
the U.N. In Prosecutor v. Bagasora,ll8 the murders were tried
as violations of Common Article Three and Additional Protocol
II of the Geneva Conventions, but questions were raised on behalf of the government of Belgium as to whether the murders
were actually an international incident. ll9 It can be argued
that an international conflict occurred between UNAMIR, a
fighting force controlled by the U.N., and Rwandan troops.120
The issue then becomes whether peacekeepers can be party to
an armed conflict. A legal expert, Eric David, filed a brief on
behalf of the Kingdom of Belgium that outlines both sides of
the argument.l21
David begins with the argument that the killing of the ten
Belgian solders was one event during the course of a noninternational armed conflict, stating that this conclusion is
supported by both fact and law. 122 First, David points out that
116 Case ICTR-96-15-T, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 'II 19 (Trial Chamber Decision
on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction) 18 June 1997. The court held, "[T]he conflict in
Rwanda as well as the stream of refugees had created a highly volatile situation in
some of the neighboring regions." [d.
117 Supra note 46.
118 Bagosora is charged with ordering the murder of the UNAMIR troops and of
Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. Case ICTR-96-7, Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Indictment
(1998) 'II 1.24.
119 Intervention de la Belgique au titre d'Amicus Curiae en l'afT. Bagosora n°
ICTR-96-7 -T [hereinafter "Amicus Curiae brief"].
120 Amicus Curiae brief, supra note 119, at 12.
121 [d.
122 [d.
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both Rwanda and UNAMIR were parties to all the Geneva
Conventions and both Additional Protocols. 123 This could be
interpreted to mean the two parties considered an eventual
conflict taking place between themselves to be potentially either non-international or internationaU24
David then looks to the facts, finding that only the Belgian
forces, and not the Ghanaian soldiers, were attacked by Rwandan troops.125 David says one could draw the conclusion that
the Belgian troops were attacked because they were Belgian
and not because they were representatives of the U.N.126 The
U.N. itself was not attacked, therefore, it was not a party to the
conflict. There are two problems with this theory. Firstly,
other motives for the killings have been suggested. For example, the Belgian troops may have been targeted precisely because they were U.N. peacekeepers, because the Rwandan government wanted Belgium to withdraw its troops from Rwanda,
crippling the peacekeeping effort.127 Secondly, even if David's
interpretation of the event is correct, the motives behind the
killings do not change the fact that U.N. troops were killed in
the course of performing their duties. The motive behind the
killings is not relevant in determining whether the incident
was international in nature.
David does not actually provide an argument in favor of
finding the Rwandan conflict to be international. Instead, he
focuses on the fact that UNAMIR was signatory to all of the
Geneva Conventions and both Additional Protocols, explaining
that Common Article Three is a minimum standard applicable
to both non-international and international conflicts. 128 David
notes that regardless of the nature of the conflict, the U.N. intended to apply at least the minimum standard of humanitarian law. 130
[d. at 13.
[d.
125 [d.
126 [d.
127 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 229.
128 Amicus Curiae brief, supra note 119, at 15. David quotes to sources arguing in
favor of finding Common Article Three applicable to all armed conflicts. [d; See also
supra note 61.
129 Amicus Curiae brief, supra note 114, at 15. David quotes to sources arguing in
favor of finding Common Article Three applicable to all armed conflicts. [d. See also
supra note 50.
130 Amicus Curiae brief, supra note 119, at 21.
123
124
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What are the arguments in favor of finding that an international conflict existed in Rwanda? The issue in this case is
whether a peacekeeping force can be party to an armed conflict.
A "party to a conflict" must be an aggressor in that conflict and
peacekeepers are not aggressors. l3l If peacekeepers are not a
party to a conflict, their involvement cannot be used to qualify
the conflict as international. In its official report on the murders, the Belgian Senate states that the soldiers were involved
in a "peacekeeping" mission. 132 The peacekeepers were deployed to protect the prime minister from harm. 133 UNAMIR
was not an aggressor in the conflict but merely observed and
maintained the peace. Indeed, one of the biggest criticisms of
UNAMIR is that it remained completely disengaged from the
conflict taking place around it. 134
It is clear from the above analysis that an international
conflict must involve either two state parties, or a state party
and a fighting force that is both an aggressor in the conflict and
under the control of a sovereign foreign body. Neither the RPF
invasion nor the UNAMIR killings meet both these criteria.
The Rwandan armed conflict does not fall within the current
definition of an international conflict. The majority of humanitarian law cannot be applied to many serious crimes committed
during the Rwandan armed conflict.
B.

REDRAFTING THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICT

Codified international law, such as the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, treats differently violations of
humanitarian law committed during international conflicts and
131 The U.N. defines peacekeeping as "a means by which the international community can encourage the establishment of sustainable peace in places and situations
where
conflict
threatens
or
has
been
recently
subdued."
At
http://www.un.org/Deptsldpko/dpkolques.htm. See also GARTH J. CARTLEDGE, LEGAL
CONSTRAINTS ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 128 (1999), reprinted in HELEN DURHAM
AND TIMOTHY L.H. McCORMACK, THE CHANGING FACE OF CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw, (Martinus Nijoff 1999), in which the author
states, "the Geneva Conventions themselves cannot be said to apply to a peacekeeping
operation unless there is an actual armed conflict applicable to the United Nations
forces themselves. Peacekeepers are not normally engaged in armed conflict.. .." [d.
132 Rapport de la Commission d'enquete parlementaire concernant les evenements
du Rwanda, Senat de Belgique, Session de 1997-1998,6 Decembre 1997 at 403.
133 GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 230.
134 See generally, GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS, supra note 45, Chapter

6.
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those committed during non-international conflicts. Any such
distinction is artificial, because similar humanitarian violations occur during international and non-international conflicts. The Rwandan armed conflict is an example of the serious non-international conflicts existing in the world today.
Such conflicts deserve to be treated under more than a "minimum humanitarian standard." International courts, such as
the ICTY and ICTR, are moving away from treating differently
non-international and international armed conflicts. Treating
international and non-international armed conflicts with different rules is confusing and serves no purpose in the effective
application of the law. The existence of two separate bodies of
law is, essentially, a political creation that has little legal justification. 135 Humanitarian law should be redrafted to create a
single body of law that applies to all armed conflicts.
The "overall control" test, developed by the ICTY, has
proved useful in the classification of armed conflicts.13G The test
requires that the causes of an armed conflict be international,
because an international conflict is defined in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols as a conflict "between High
Contracting Parties."137 Only when two High Contracting Parties cause a conflict will that conflict be classified as international. The "overall control" test excludes many of today's
armed conflicts, because many conflicts do not involve two High
Contracting Parties. Despite the involvement of only one High
Contracting Party, many of these conflicts have a considerable
effect on neighboring countries. 13S Rwanda is an example of
such a conflict.139
135 MORRIS & SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
supra note 6, at 207.
136 Supra note 90.
137 Geneva Convention I, supra note 7.
138 Commission of Experts 'lI 109. For example, the influx of Rwandan refugees
(many of whom were involved in the genocide) has added to the instability of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Developments, Zaire
(1994), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/19951WR95/AFRICA-ll.htm#P581_209577. "The
security situation in the refugee camps in Goma, Zaire became increasingly volatile by
the end of 1994 due to the activities of former Rwandan army troops and militia members, most of whom were still armed .... " [d. The Rwandan armed conflict has had an
effect on other neighbors, such as Burundi. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights
Developments,
Burundi
(1994),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reportsl19951WR95/AFRICA-02.htm#P87_30999. "The influx of
thousands of Rwandan refugees after the genocide began in their country in early April
heightened tensions, particularly in those parts of northern Burundi near the frontier."
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Many important armed conflicts occurring in the world today are made up of a complex mixture of international and
non-international conflicts.14o The nature of potential foreignstate involvement is often difficult to quantify.141 Equally difficult to discern is the intentions of the foreign government regarding the armed conflict.142 The level of foreign-state involvement in many such conflicts does not rise to the threshold
of international involvement. 143 Nonetheless, many of these
conflicts have unquestionably had a serious effect on neighboring states. 144 The regional effects of many non-international
armed conflicts are easily observable and widely documented.
[d; See also Human Rights Watch, Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing
Protest
(May
2000),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reportsl2000/drc/Drc005.htm#TopOfPage.
"The Interahamwe,
originally a Rwandan Hutu militia which helped lead the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,
now include the remnants of that group plus others, both Rwandan and Congolese
Hutu, who have joined with them in fighting the current government of Rwanda." [d.
139 Supra note 138.
140 See generally Human Rights Watch, Overview of Human Rights Developments, Angola, 2002, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2001, and Liberia 2003, available
at http://hrw.org/docf?t=africa, for examples of other complex African "civil wars." [d.
In particular, the recently concluded "civil war" in the Democratic Republic of Congo
[hereinafter "DRC") contains many international aspects that have yet to be fully explored. See Human Rights Watch, D.R. Congo: U.N. Must Address Corporate Role in
War (October 27,2003), available at http://hrw.org/pressl2003/10/drc102703.htm.
Since August 1998, the DRC has been enmeshed in one of Africa's most widespread wars, directly involving six other countries. The armies of Rwanda,
Uganda and Burundi along with Congolese rebel groups were pitted against the
DRC government, supported by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Under increasing international pressure, the bulk of the foreign armies have withdrawn from
Congo in the past year but they left behind many vested interests and a network
of economic ties. Illicit economic exploitation reportedly continues through armed
groups linked to neighboring countries and corrupt government officials. [d.
141 For example, the armed conflict in the DRC involves both the direct and indirect involvement of Angola, Zimbabwe and Rwanda. A blurred line exists between
criminal groups exploiting the conflict and armed forces ensuring regional stability.
See generally Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of N atural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (16
October 2002) [hereinafter "Panel Report on the DRC"), S/200211146, § 13 - 17, available at http://www.uni-gruppe.de/deutsch/psfeb03/documents/s2002.pdf.
142 For example, the Rwandan government argues its troops in the DRC serve a
peacekeeping function, while the Commission of Experts accuses the Rwandan government of plunder. Panel Report on the DRC § 65, 66.
143 Geneva
Convention I, supra note 7, Preamble, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf77c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/fe2Oc3d903ce27e3c12
5641e004a92f3?OpenDocument.
144 Supra note 138.
Acknowledging the interrelatedness of armed conflicts
throughout central Africa, the U.N. is working toward a "Conference on the Great
Lakes Region." Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of
the Security-Council mission to Central Africa, S/2004152 (January, 20 2004) § 55.
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Regional conflicts, or conflicts having a serious and documented effect on neighboring states, should be categorized as
international conflicts because of their international consequences. Additional Protocol I would then cover both conflicts
occurring between sovereign states and conflicts having a serious and document regional effect. Additional Protocols I and II
would, in effect, be merged to create a new Protocol applying to
all serious armed conflictS. 145 State sovereignty would be ensured by retaining the language of Additional Protocol II,
which excludes "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature." 146 This language excludes
purely internal incidents that do not effect neighboring states.
Were a new definition of international armed conflicts adopted,
all serious armed conflicts would be equally covered by international law. No longer would the nature of an armed conflict
determine the applicable law.
III. CONCLUSION
Currently, different sets of laws exist for violations of humanitarian law committed during non-international conflicts
and for those committed during international conflicts. Identical crimes are treated to different sets of laws, depending upon
the nature of the conflict during which the crimes took place. A
change in the definition of an international conflict is required
to do away with this discriminatory treatment. The Rwandan
armed conflict is not classified as an international conflict under the current definition. The Rwandan conflict, however, like
many serious conflicts involving non-state parties, affects the
stability of the entire region surrounding Rwanda. Nevertheless, the Rwandan armed conflict is covered by only the bare
minimum of humanitarian law. The Additional Protocols
145 Supra note 64.
See also THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw AND FuNDAMENTAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICTS IN WHICH NON-STATE ENTITIES ARE PARTIES, (The Institute of International Law 1999). "Therefore it is desirable and necessary that States,
the United Nations and competent regional and other international organizations ... draft and adopt a convention designed to regulate all armed conflicts and protect
all victims, regardless of whether such conflicts are international, non-international or
ofa mixed character." [d.
146 See Additional Protocol II, supra note 64, art. 1.
147 See Additional Protocol II, supra note 62, art. 1.
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should be merged into one Protocol, covering not only armed
conflicts taking place between two High Contracting Parties,
but also armed conflicts involving only one High Contracting
Party but having a serious effect on neighboring states. All
serious armed conflicts would be covered by the full extent of
humanitarian law.
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